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EXCISE

Cuba

The Attorney General told the Group about a series of meetings which had been held recently with higher authority. Out of these had come a decision that higher priority should be given to Cuba. General Lanedale had been designated as "Chief of Operations," with authority to call on all appropriate Government agencies for assistance, including the assignment of senior representatives from State, Defense and CIA. General Lanedale is to keep the Special Group informed of his progress, but is authorized to take actions now which are clearly desirable to strengthen operations and facilities now in being. In making this appointment, the need for General Lanedale in the Far East had been recognized but it had been decided that for the time being his responsibility would be Cuba.

After some discussion, it was agreed that General Lanedale should develop a long-range program which would be reviewed by the Special Group and then presented for approval to higher authority. At that time, formal language would be proposed to record the decision to pursue a new or revised Cuba policy. General Lanedale will meet with the Special Group next week to report progress and actions required.

General Lanedale then gave his appreciation of the situation. He said that, bearing in mind the objective [of fostering] eventual revolution within Cuba, he had surveyed all resources available.

He had concluded that there are a sizeable number of latent as well

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as active resources, but that there is a very difficult job ahead. He stressed also the necessity of coming to an agreement at some early date as to the future of Cuba after the Castro government is overthrown, so that appeals to potential resistance elements can be geared to a positive long-range program. General Lansdale also thought it important to obtain cooperation and assistance from selected Latin American countries, preferably those not previously involved with U.S. anti-Castro activities.

General Lansdale then said that he has looked at the proposed operation designed to sabotage a power plant. He had concluded that the conception and planning of this project has been very well done by CIA; on the other hand, he feels that it would be unwise to mount the operation in the immediate future because it would tend to increase Cuban security measures and thereby make it more difficult to get on with building up resistance elements. The Group agreed that, considering all these circumstances, the sabotage operation should be postponed. In this connection, Mr. Bissell, although not disagreeing with the decision, said that he thought it should be noted that a cancellation of plans for early December would almost certainly mean a delay of at least two months, taking into consideration the impending weather conditions as well as moon phases.

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Mr. Bissell also said that he thought it desirable to proceed at once with building up the Agency's maritime capability and providing ECM equipment for two C-54's. It was agreed that these measures are consistent with the new approach and should be pursued.

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Finally, in answer to the Chairman's question as to the significance of the two weeks review which had been elsewhere alluded to, the Attorney General said that this was intended to mean a review by the Special Group, with subsequent reference to higher authority.

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